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Cathy's avatar

The contingency fee structure for WISeR is the tell — paying vendors a percentage of what they deny isn't utilization management, it's incentivized denial with extra steps. The conflict of interest isn't incidental to the design, it is the design.

The provider budget argument is compelling precisely because it eliminates the middleman who profits from saying no. But it raises a question the piece doesn't quite answer: who sets the budget, and on what basis? Because the same insurers currently running prior authorization would likely be involved in setting those budgets, and the conflict of interest follows the money wherever it goes.

The deeper problem is that prior authorization exists because we built a system where the entity paying for care has a financial interest in minimizing it. That conflict can't be engineered away with better reimbursement models — it has to be removed structurally. A universal funding floor where the payer is not a profit-seeking entity eliminates the incentive to deny entirely. Medicare already does this for 69 million people without the prior authorization apparatus that MA plans have built.

I've been working on a framework that extends that principle — universal coverage with private delivery, funded through a mechanism that takes the profit motive out of the coverage decision. burnedatbothends.org if you want to see the architecture. The prior authorization problem largely disappears when the funding structure changes.

Bruce Taylor's avatar

Very well said, my friend. I’m a retired surgeon, and now Medicare patient, and I always appreciate your informed commentary.

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